

PEACE AND WAR IN ARMENIAN THOUGHT:
A CHRISTIANITY OF FRONTIER FACING
CHRISTIAN AND NON CHRISTIAN POWERS

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“Eti kai eti en eirēnē tou Kuriou deēthōmen”, “Ew ews xałaluteamb zTēr ałaçesc‘uk”... This has been the specific claim and vow of almost all Eastern Christendom “at the beginning of its words”, to use a Biblical expression¹ made his own by Surb Grigor Narekatsi², St. Gregory of Narek, the sublime mystical poet of Christian Armenia. “At the beginning of its words”: this means, when putting itself as a living Community in front of its Lord to celebrate His worship and to present Him its own prayer, and wishes for itself, and for human society around itself. This vow has been for almost two millennia the first, initial, basic exhortation addressed and inspired to the Assembly of the Eastern Christian faithful by the Deacon, their instructor and guide *ex officio* to introduce them into the divine mysteries.

This aspiration to peace did not, however, prevent such a great Christian power as the Byzantine Empire to think of peace essentially with regard to itself, to its own interest, its own hegemony, its own vital space. The same could also be said, however, without any hesitation and restriction, of the various Empires and strong Kingdoms of Western Christianity. These States made of those elements the main criteria, the unavoidable landmarks to decide between peace and war, not only with regard to the non Christian world, but also to all those Christians of whom they thought as of their natural subjects. All this in the very name of Christ who was considered by those Christian States as the source and the justifying reason of their Royal and Imperial power.

It is not at present my purpose to discuss, whether such a conception of peace and war, of political power and of the relations between peoples and civil societies in contact may be considered as properly Christian or not, as compatible with the message and the doctrine of Jesus of Nazareth in whose name His believers, Christian Kings and Emperors moved their bloody wars. My personal conviction is that such a conception had nothing to do with genuine Christianity, with the true thought of Jesus. Rather than a misunderstanding or a misinterpretation of the Gospel’s message, it was,

¹ Prv. 18, 17, according to *Septuaginta*, followed by the Armenian version.

² *Matean Olbergut‘ean*, IX. See: Boghos Levon ZEKIYAN, *La Spiritualità armena. Il Libro della Lamentazione di Gregorio di Narek*, traduzione e note di B.L. Zekiyan, introduzione di B.L. Zekiyan e Claudio Guggerotti, Edizioni Studium, Roma, 1999, p. 195 (in Italian version).

I think, simply and openly, a betrayal of Christ's thought and will. This is affirmed of course independently of the individual subjective conscience, subjective intentions, and personal good will of the members of the communities involved, all these personal interior data being known only and exclusively to Almighty God. Obviously we cannot judge persons and consciences, as no human being may absolutely do it, but we can evaluate their expressed thoughts and visions, their accomplished acts and misdeeds! We even owe ethically to do so, although without any anachronistic virulence, taking into account all various contextual factors and parameters.

This is not, however, as I already said, our purpose here. We aim on the contrary at looking deeper, if this ideology of the Medieval Christian super-powers, as we have described it in its most basic traits, was the only thinkable and possible, and the only effectively existing then in the Christian *oikumene*. I shall take into consideration for this purpose the case of a single Christian nation, the Armenians, in the so called periphery, at the Eastern boarder, of the Byzantine Empire.

Armenia has never been in its history a super-power, if we except Tigran II the Great's short-life Empire (95-55 b.C.); it has been on the contrary a middle, sometimes even a great power, for considerable periods of its statehood in the course of its millennia-long history.

I think that to understand and evaluate in its historical dynamics the Armenian ideology in that Armenia's relations with neighbouring States and peoples are concerned during the many centuries of Armenian history, we must consider the following point.

Much differently from what happened in modern times, earlier history is essentially a history of the clash, often a most violent clash, of super-powers. In front of these giants there was no much difference in those times between States of lesser, or middle, or even of a rather greater power. The giants imposed their rule, and the only means to evade such an imposition was armed resistance, if this was considered as possible or suitable on the basis of the self-appraisal of a State's or a nation's³

³ I use the word "nation" in the frame of its traditional meaning in which it has been used for long centuries by the Armenians. It basically differs from the meaning of the term in the frame of the Nation-State ideology, which became normative in the Western world with the French Revolution. We can say that it is mainly related to those realities which are expressed today in the Western world by such terms as *ethnos*, *ethnic*, *ethnicity*. For a wider consideration see: B.L. ZEKIYAN, "L' 'idéologie' nationale de Movs²s Xorenac' i et sa conception de l'histoire", *Handes Amsorya*, CI (1987), pp. 471-485; ID., *Ellenismo, ebraismo e cristianesimo in Mosè di Corene (Movsês Xorenac' i). Elementi per una teologia dell'etnia*, in *Cristianesimo e giudaismo: eredità e confronti*, XVI Incontro di Studiosi dell'Antichità Cristiana: "Augustinianum", XXVIII (1988), pp. 381-390; ID., "Les identités polyvalentes et Sergue Paradzvanov. La situation emblématique de l'artiste et le problème de la polyvalence ethnique et culturelle", *Filosofia Oggi*, XVI (1993), pp. 217-231; ID., "In margine alla storia. Dal fenomeno dell'emigrazione verso un nuovo concetto dell'identità e dell'integrazione etnoculturale, *Ad limina Italiae. In viaggio per l'Italia con mercanti e monaci armeni*, ed. by B.L. Zekiyani, (Eurasistica. Quaderni del Dipartimento di Studi Eurasiatici, Università degli Studi di Venezia, 37), Editoriale Programma, Padova, 1996, pp. 267-286; ID., *Das Verhältnis zwischen Sprache und Identität in der Entwicklung des*

available forces. The reason for this is given by the legal, or rather the non legal system at all, ruling in those times (and perhaps not only in those times) the relations among States, i.e. the various Kingdoms and principalities: a system characterized by almost an absolute lack of the idea of *legal* sovereignty and of its respect, as these ideas have been formulated and developed from the Renaissance onwards; a system based, on the contrary, almost exclusively on the *ratio fortioris*, the stronger's right. The grounds for sovereignty in Antiquity, and even in the Middle Ages, did not lie so much in a given law or right, but rather in people's greater or lesser capacity of defending it by force.

In such a historical context it did not matter a lot, whether Armenia was then a moderately great, or middle, or lesser power. The only important thing was that from time to time it had to face by force the various super-powers of the historical moment: Romans, Parthians, Sasanians, Byzantines, Arabs, Seljuks, Crusaders, Mongols, Mamluks, or it had to negotiate with them by other means.

It is not easy to synthesize in a few words or to reduce to a few categorial assumptions a history of thought and behaviour covering seventeen centuries of history, if we take as a start point of our investigation the Christian Kingdom of Armenia from the date of its official conversion, 301 according to traditional

armenischen Nationalbewußtseins. Versuch einer begrifflichen Formulierung aus geschichtlicher Erfahrung, in *Über Muttersprachen und Vaterländer. Zur Entwicklung von Standardsprachen und Nationen in Europa*, G. Hentschel (Hrsg.), Peter Lang, Frankfurt a. Main, Berlin, Bern, New York, Paris, Wien 1997, pp. 277-297 (I use "Subcaucasia" to indicate Southern Caucasus, known also as Transcaucasia, and the regions to its South and South-West forming historic Armenia; in other words, to indicate Transcaucasia and Eastern Anatolia, that is modern North-Eastern Turkey, together); "The Armenian Way to Enlightenment: the Diaspora and Its Role", in *Enlightenment and Diaspora. The Armenian and Jewish Cases*, ed. by Richard G. Hovannisian and David N. Myers, Scholars Press, Atlanta, Georgia, 1999, pp. 45-85; Giusto TRAINA, *Il complesso di Trimalcione. Movsès Xorenac'i e le origini del pensiero storico armeno*, (Eurasistica. 27), Casa Editrice Armena, Venezia 1991; Jean-Pierre MAHÉ, "Entre Moïse et Mahomet: réflexions sur l'historiographie arménienne", *Revue des Études Arméniennes*, vol. XXIII, 1992, pp. 121-153.

⁴ A debate is still under way on the very date of this conversion, oscillating from the various dates going back to the 3rd century till 314 as *terminus post quem non*. See: Paolo ANANIAN, "La data e le circostanze della consecrazione di S. Gregorio Illuminatore", in *Le Muséon*, LXXIV (1961), pp. 43-73, 317-360; Marie-Louise CHAUMONT, *Recherches sur l'histoire d'Arménie de l'avènement des Sassanides à la conversion du Royaume*, Paris, 1969, pp. 131-164; *Roma-Armenia*, a cura di Claude Mutafian, De Luca, Roma, 1999: III, "Gli inizi del cristianesimo di Stato": Ruben MANASERYAN, "Il re d'Armenia e l'imperatore di Roma: Gli aspetti ideologici dei loro rapporti e la conversione al cristianesimo", pp. 59-61; Jean-Pierre MAHÉ, "Il primo secolo dell'Armenia cristiana (298 - 387): dalla letteratura alla storia", pp. 64-72.

computation⁴, of which we will be celebrating next year the 17th centenary. We can, however, point out some main trends that appear in different periods, contexts, and situations. Then we can put the question, if we can infer from those trends some common basic features of the Armenian Christian tradition, of the Armenian thought on peace and war.

The best way of analysis in similar cases, from a methodological point of view, is to look, I think, into the formative period. This is that period in which the grounds are laid for the collective identity, the communitarian ideology or what the German terminology more properly calls the *Weltanschauung* of a given ethnic or religious group⁵. Generally that period marks the subsequent historical evolution and developments in the thought and behaviour of that group. Hence we shall first try to define some basic trends in the formative period of the Armenian Christian *Weltanschauung*, and then to ascertain, if and to what extent we can consider them as characterizing also the Armenian thought and behaviour of subsequent periods.

We consider at present as formative for the Christian Armenian vision of the world the period from the 4th through the 7th centuries. Normally the earliest age of Armenian Christian literature, i.e. 5th through 7th centuries, is considered as being the formative period of the Armenian Christian tradition. I myself discussed this matter in recent works⁶. Hence I shall not go here once again into details to explain the reasons which make of this period the age par excellence of the formation of the Armenian Christian tradition in its main features. I will only add here to the above mentioned centuries the 4th century, which is the first Christian century of the Armenian Kingdom, since for a more adequate consideration of our topic we also must take into account the pre-literary period of the 4th century as it has been reflected in the literary sources transmitted to us since the 5th century.

The 4th century in Armenian history has been characterized by one of the most disastrous political acts that both the super-powers of the age, in perfect agreement with one another, consumed in spite of Armenia: they decided in 384 the division of the Armenian Kingdom into two smaller Kingdoms, Eastern and Western, submitted

⁵ In using these terms I refer to François Châtelet and his collaborators in *Histoires des idéologies*, vol.s I-III, Hachette, Paris, 1978; see vol. I, "Introduction générale", pp. 10-11.

⁶ "Riflessioni preliminari sulla spiritualità armena. Una cristianità di «frontiera»: martyria ed apertura all'oikumene", in *Orientalia Christiana Periodica*, 61 (1995), pp. 333-365; "L'Armenia tra Bisanzio e l'Iran dei Sasanidi e momenti della fondazione dell'ideologia dell'Armenia cristiana (secc. V-VII). Preliminari per una sintesi", in *Crossroad of Cultures. Studies in Liturgy and Patristics in Honor of Gabriele Winkler*, ed. by Hans-Jürgen Feulner, Elena Velkovska, and Robert F. Taft, S.J., (*Orientalia Christiana Analecta*, 260), Pontificium Institutum Orientale, Roma, 2000, pp. 717-744.

to or at least controlled respectively by the Iranian Sasanian and by the Eastern Roman Empires. This meant effectively the end of the Armenian Kingdom in late Antiquity. Since after the death or the resignation, presumably forced, of the King of Western Armenia, Aršak III, Byzantines did not allow any new succession on the throne, and the Eastern Kingdom was brought to an end by the Sasanians in 428 - although on instigation and with the complicity of most of the Armenian princes⁷. Up to that moment, however, the Armenian Kingdom fought against Sasanians two kinds of battles:

- a) in first person, mainly in a defensive perspective, to block Persian attacks and attempts of invasion into the country; we can say that not even one case is mentioned then in which the Armenian army attacks first, and crosses first the marchland;
- b) as a subaltern ally of the Romans. In this context we have more than one case of a Roman-Armenian allied first attack onto Persia⁸.

From both these observations we are able to draw a first conclusion: in so far the classical distinction between defensive and aggressive war is considered as valid for the majority of cases in the pre-contemporary world, Armenians avoided as a principle provoking by themselves, for whatever reason may it be - not excluding that of preventing an eventual/probable attack -, their huge rival. They did not exclude however, on the contrary they felt it almost as a duty imposed by their alliance - reinforced now by their common faith - to fight side by side with the Romans, even if an aggressive war, or at least a first attack on their behalf was at issue.

We can now elaborate further this first conclusion at the light of what happened at the mid-fifth century. Sasanians wanted to impose to Armenia their official Mazdean religion. Never earlier this pretension had reached such a paroxysm of vehemence as then. The Armenians, in a written reply to the King of Kings, Yazdegerd II, formulate their position on the matter, with extreme decision and precision, in the following terms: QUOTE EGHISHE⁹.

⁷ The far-seeing genius of St. Mesrop Maštoc' (362-439), the inventor of the Armenian Alphabet (c. 405) and the main inspirator of its literary culture, and certainly the great moulder not only of the Armenian cultural identity, but also of the very idea of a national identity based on culture and literacy, much probably perceived the division of the Armenian Kingdom as the announcement of its forthcoming end: cf. B.L. ZEKIYAN, "L' 'idéologie' nationale de Movs²s Xorenac' i", (cit. in n. 3), pp. 478; for further analysis see: ID., *Das Verhältnis zwischen Sprache und Identität*, (cit. in n. 3).

⁸ For a general outlook of the history of Armenia in the 4th century one of the sources are *The Epic Histories Attributed to P'awstos Buzand (Buzandaran Patmut' iwnk')*, translation and commentary by Nina G. Garsoïan, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA, 1989, provided with a wide introduction, a glossary of technical terms, and detailed, well-informed notes on single issues.

⁹ ELIŠĚ, *History of Vardan and the Armenian War*, (Harvard Armenian Texts and Studies, 5), Translation and Commentary by Robert W. Thomson, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA/London, 1982, Introduction, pp. 1-53. **For a critical survey of the various**

As it is to see very clearly, the main issue that, in the given context, matters for the Armenians above all is not independence, nor sovereignty. It is only, and only, the preservation of their identity: their religious identity. A religious identity which, in virtue of its existential impact and by the very way of its formation and actual formulation, is also inclusive of what in Western categories we call today ethnic and cultural identity. This inner connection will be in any case further precised and made explicit at all in a subsequent historical context that we shall be speaking immediately of. As to the mid-fifth century, however, the intention and decision of the Armenians are utmost clear. They do not pursue eagerly independence or full sovereignty. Hence they will not attack, but if attacked, they will fight till the last drop of blood to defend their identity, what they actually are. This means, in equivalent terms, to defend their human dignity; this consisted for them in keeping absolute faith to their religion, that is, in the final analysis, to their conscience, as well as to their ethno-cultural identity.

Although it may appear obvious enough by what we have been talking of, it would by no means be superfluous, I think, to draw special attention to one point: the War of the Vardanank' was not, on the part of the Armenians, a religious war in the generally accepted sense of the term. They fought it with no intention whatever of imposing a belief, nor was it motivated by any desire to implement religious discrimination or intolerance: it was no more than a revolt against arrogance in defence of the religious freedom and identity of a people.

The subsequent step in formulating the Armenian Christian vision on peace and war was made towards the end of the 5th century. The battle of Awarayr, or of Vardan, the commander-in-chief, and his companions, of 451 succeeded in blocking the Sasanian advance in the country, and gave the input to an armed resistance of a guerilla typology which after more than thirty years of ups and downs resulted victorious, and lead to the peace treaty of Nuarsak in 484. What did Armenians require from or rather impose to their Sasanian rivals as peace conditions?

- a) no one was to be forced to change religion;
- b) people were not to be judged on the basis of their social condition, but rather according to their actions;
- c) no action based merely on hearsay was to be taken by the authorities against anyone; rather they could act only with full knowledge of the case in point.

Such conditions constitute a lesson of civilization that goes well beyond the concept and practices prevailing in those times as regards human rights. It will not be

philological questions on Elišē see B.L. ZEKIYAN, "Quelques observations critiques sur le «Corpus Elisaeanum»", in *The Armenian Christian Tradition. Scholarly Symposium in Honor of the Visif to the Pontifical Oriental Institute, Rome of His Holiness KAREKIN I Supreme Patriarch and Catholicos of All Armenians*, December 12, 1996, ed. by Robert F. Taft, S.J., (Orientalia Christiana Analecta, 254), Pontif. Ist. Orientale, Roma 1997, pp. 71-123. For a historical introduction to the War of Awarayr or of Vardanank' (= Vardan and his companions; in Armenian it is called *Vardananc'*, the Genitive form of *Vardanank'*)

exaggerated even to say that these same objectives could well be pursued today in many places and circumstances. Such an attitude had of course very much to do with the condition of a people that simply could not aim at the domination of others, but merely desired to live undisturbed with due respect granted to their faith and identity.

The fact is that in the newly created political context, consequently to the military victory carried off over the Sasanians, the Armenians enlarge, deepen, and make more explicit the implications of the concept of identity, their comprehension of it as well as the self-awareness of their own identity and of its formulation. From the minimum required in order to affirm an identity and to preserve it in its most essential feature the Armenians pass to formulate a more comprehensive, and more adequate notion of identity, so that its affirmation and safeguard may be guaranteed, in the future, no more by bloody struggle, war and martyrdom, but by a legal order based on some fundamental requirements of human rights and dignity.

A further basic step in the Armenian conception of war, peace, political alliance and related topics will be achieved first, partially, as a reaction to the policy of Justinian, and then, more decidedly, as a consequence of the entry of the Arabs into the scene of Armenian history.

Justinian extended to Armenia his so called “administrative reforms” which in reality aimed at making of Armenia a province of the Byzantine Empire. He dementled indeed Armenia’s inner millenary administrative structure, based on the very peculiar feudal system of the *naxarars*, that formed the backbone of Armenia’s inner autonomy and basic political stability. No other imperial power, not even the Sasanians, had conceived or attempted earlier something like that. This induced the Armenians to rethink their whole earlier strategy based on the community of faith. They started to realize that community of faith does not necessarily mean a community of political interests, all the less a major respect and guarantee for their political autonomy. In such a political and ideological context they did their famous anti-Chalcedonian choice at mid-sixth century at the 2nd Council of Dvin (553-555)¹⁰. The final anti-Chalcedonian trends of the Armenian Church, in its official and majoritarian attitude, ran parallel to the developments of the Byzantine policy at issue, and certainly helped to trigger and organize ethnic defense mechanisms against the policy of assimilation the Empire surreptitiously pursued by religious means, among others.

¹⁰ For chronology, opinions, comments, and bibliography see B.L. ZEKIYAN, “Quelques observations critiques sur le «Corpus Eliseaeum»”, pp. 89-101. A basic and classical work on Armenia under Justinian is that of Nikolaj Adontz, first published in Russian: N. Adonc, *Armeniya v epoxu Yustiniana. Političeskoe sostoyanie na osnov naxararskago stroya*, Sk.-Peterburg, 1908 (repr. Erevan, 1971, in photostatic edition, as a “2nd edition” with an introduction by Karen N. Yuzbašyan, pp. 3-20); English translation: *Armenia in the Period of Justinian. The Political Conditions Based on the Naxarar System*, translated with partial revisions, a bibliographical note and appendices by Nina G. Garsoïan, (Armenian Library of the Calouste Gulbenkian Foudation), Imprimerie Orientaliste, Leuven, 1970.

Justinian's policy was indeed not only carried on by his successors, but also systematically enhanced. Thus episodes of Armenian alliance with the Sasanians from those years onwards, till the Arabic conquest, are not rare. We even see some active participation of Armenians aside with Sasanians, or in struggles between rival factions in Persia according to an evaluation of the political situation with relation to its repercussions in Armenia¹¹. I would say that we see here something similar, to some extent, to that attitude which we have seen in the 4th century within the context of the Armenian alliance with the Romans.

The Arabic conquest introduces something new into Armenian history, and especially into the demographic, hierarchic, and administrative configuration of the Armenian society¹². The Arabs for the Armenians were no more, as were Romans and Sasanians an outer conquering power, they became an inner ruling power with solid roots in the territory. This factual situation had among other effects also the one that it served to strengthen in some critical circumstances the new conviction of the Armenians that not necessarily their vital interests would match better with those of Christian Byzantium. They could in given circumstances match better with the Arab interests. Although the Arabs succeeded in penetrating into Armenia to a much larger and deeper extent, their presence was not necessarily and universally seen as that of an enemy in every respect.

At this point a new factor enters in action. The objective of preserving their ethno-cultural identity becomes for the Armenians something more and more important with regard to the preservation of some administrative autonomy. And paradoxically, but not unexplainably, Christian Byzantium represented from the times of Justinian onward a greater threat for Armenian identity than Muslim Arabs. This does not mean, however, that Armenians had not to fight according to various circumstantial factors on both fronts. Thus three memorable insurrections against the dominant Arab power are registered in Armenia in the 7th century which had a tragic end.

¹¹ For details see: René GROUSSET, *Histoire de l'Arménie des origines à 1071*, Payot, Paris, 1947, pp. 244-272. See also James HOWARD-JOHNSTON, "Introduction": I and III, pp. Xi-xxx, lxi-lxxvii, "Historical Commentary", pp. 155-288, in *The Armenian History attributed to Sebeos*, Translated, with notes, by R. W. Thomson, Historical commentary by J. Howard-Johnston, Assistance from Tim Greenwood, Part I. Translation and notes; Part II. Historical Commentary, Liverpool University Press, 2000.

¹² On the period in general of the Arabic domination see: Joseph LAURENT, *L'Arménie entre Byzance et l'Islam depuis la conquête arabe jusqu'en 886*, Paris, 1919, nouvelle édition revue et mise à jour par M. Canard, (Armenian Library of the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation), Librairie Bertrand, Lisbonne, 1980; Aram TER-GHEWONDYAN, *The Arab Emirates in Bagratid Armenia*, Translated by Nina G. Garsoïan, (Armenian Library of the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation), Livraria Bertrand, Lisbon, 1976 (the Armenian original: *Arabakan amirayut'iwinner@Bagratuneac' Hayastanum*, Ed.s of the Academy of Sciences of ASSR, Erevan, 1965).

The trend of history will not change before the end of the 8th century. At the dawn of the 9th century, the formation of a sizable Armenian power in some parts of the traditional Armenian homeland will seem to the Calif as an efficient means to raise a barrier to the increasing centrifugal power of the Arab emirs ruling in the

country. The Bagratids, the main royal dynasty ruling in Northern Armenia in the 9th through 11th centuries, will even have the wisdom and far-sightedness not to coin their own money, but to use monies circulating in the Arabic Empire, in order not to raise in the Calif, their great allied, any suspicions about their willingness to stay in his alliance. In fact, both the Bagratid Kingdom in the North and the Arçruni Kingdom in the South were destroyed, respectively in 1045 and in 1021, not by the Muslim Arabs, but by Christian Byzantium. Suppressing these Armenian buffer States par excellence on its Eastern boundaries, the Byzantine Empire made its Eastern flank utmost vulnerable to the invasions from the East. Indeed Byzantines could enjoy not even for thirty years the exhilaration of their almost millenary dream of annexing Armenia. The defeat of Manzikerta, in 1071, would definitely open the doors of Anatolia to the conquering Turks.

Conclusions

We can sum up. To say it in a few words, Christian Armenia did not nourish ambitions for conquest or for any kind of war aiming to subjugate others. But it did not hesitate at all to take up arms when its religious and cultural identity was in peril, or was thought to be so.

Their Christian faith would have lead them to develop rather a pro-Roman or pro-Western attitude. But the Western Emperialism, being more rational, hence more linear and radical, than Eastern Emperialisms, in its conception of unique rule and order, has been incapable to understand and to appreciate in its due value and in its historic function the Armenian particularity and particularism¹³ (nota AMMONIUS). Not rarely, after Justinian, did Armenians see in the *disparitas cultus* of the Sasanians or of the Arabs, and later of the Ottomans a better and major guarantee to preserve their ethnic and religious particularity.

This basic Armenian ideology will accompany Armenians for long centuries, guaranteeing their survival even through the most unfavourable historic moments. It will unfortunately undergo some change, when young intellectuals, destitute of any political experience will be ravished by the West and its bogus, almost hypocrite promises. This will lead the late Ottoman government of the Young Turks, equally imbued with hybrid Western ideologies, to see the solution of the Armenian question in the most radical and negative option: that of the first exemplary Genocide of the 20th century. But this chapter of the development of the Armenian ideology, though utmost interesting for our actual topic with regard to the remarkable shift of the Aremnian ideology in more recent times, as a consequence of a more intimate and

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